Absolute Certainty

The reason I selected this particular topic is partially apologetic and partially personal. The personal reason why I selected this topic will have to be addressed in another paper; it would take too much room to address it here. As far as the apologetic reason is concerned, this paper is a philosophical response to epistemological attacks from certain schools of thought against the truth of the Christian faith. There are many of these schools of thought, if they can properly called schools of thought that have attacked the truth of the claims of Christianity or theism in general. Some of the major players are Postmodernity (1), Atheism, Skepticism, and the Modern Scientific community. The common or unified attack coming from all these groups may be more properly understood as a challenge; their challenge is an epistemological one in that they request that we ‘prove’ to them that the claims of Christianity are true, or at least offer them sufficient evidence to validate the same.

What, in essence, are they asking? What do they mean when they say, ‘prove it’? At first it appears that what they want is, in general, about the same amount of evidence that they accept for validation of one of their scientific or academic propositions. It could also be that they want about the same amount of rational (or logical) arguments that they accept to validate the varied propositions of their various ‘schools’ of thought. Neither of these will do though, for no amount of evidence, no pile of arguments will give them the ‘proof’ they want and require of us. What they want is proof beyond doubt. Their challenge to Christianity is for the Christian intellectuals to do whatever it takes to show them that the claims of Christianity can be held in absolute certainty.

In a very subtle way, their attacks are inconsistent. They ask of Christianity what they cannot offer for themselves concerning their core beliefs. According to David Hume, no amount of evidence (physical or logical) will give any person justification for believing anything beyond doubt because all knowledge is founded on perception of cause and effect and no mind can find the effect in the supposed cause. (2) The inconsistency that pervades the assault is that they request something to be done that they do not even believe (or better, cannot logically believe) can happen. My contention is that for the Postmodernist, the Atheist, the Skeptic, and the Modern Scientist to be consistent with there own worldview, they cannot believe in absolute certainty or belief beyond doubt. Absolute certainty is sufficient but not necessary for knowledge; however, absolute certainty is impossible under a naturalistic metaphysic. It is prerequisite in understanding the first part of my argument, of course, that I am contending this part under a supernatural metaphysic, the second part of the argument, is to show that under a naturalistic metaphysic, absolute certainty is not possible at all.

Finally, the stage is now set to address this issue. First, we will set out to make a distinction between certainty in general (which I will call mere certainty) and absolute certainty: what I mean when I say each and how they are different in essence, cause, and effects. Second, we will turn our attention specifically towards absolute certainty, and particularly, how it cannot fit into a naturalistic metaphysical view.

Certainty

Certainty, according to simple definition, is the state of being free from doubt. (3) This definition will not be very helpful in our purposes here, for it is plain, based on experience, that certainty comes in degrees. It makes perfect sense for me to say, ‘I am fairly certain that my birthday is in February’ or ‘I am very certain that my name is Joshua Shirey’, or even ‘I am somewhat certain that George Washington was the first President of the United States.’ In each of these cases, certainty is present yet in varying degrees. It is not that I either have certainty or I do not, but that certainty can be had at varying levels of intensity. The degree certainty is held is directly proportionate to the amount of doubt that accompanies the belief. (4)

According to the argument above, doubt is not the enemy of belief, per se, but it is a natural part of human cognitive faculties. It is part of a person’s epistemic duty to doubt things, particularly, things or propositions that are not true. (5) As doubt relates to true beliefs, it is perfectly rational to doubt things or propositions that are true. If a person who I knew to be a habitual liar and prankster came into my room and told me that the building was on fire, I would have good reasons to doubt the truth of his statement. However, it may indeed be true that the building is on fire, but I have no good reason to believe, without further investigation, that the building is in fact on fire, because of my knowledge of the individual. It may be helpful here to differentiate between belief and certainty. Belief is simply that act of holding something to be true, certainty is the strength of our trust that we are justified or warranted in our belief, which is proportionate to the doubt that we have in regards to our holding something as true. This is why it makes perfect sense to say ‘I believe this and such, but I have my doubts.’ Therefore, doubt and certainty are different from belief and unbelief.

It follows from the argument above that evidence effects the degree of doubt and certainty. Upon further investigation, I might find that, indeed it is true that the building is on fire, and I would found this belief on things like seeing the flame and smoke, hearing the fire alarm, being asked by an authority to evacuate, etc. However, no amount of evidence can completely remove all possibility of doubt. What if the whole fire scenario were a dream? While I was having the dream, there would be a lack of evidence present to convince me that the building was not on fire (after having seen the flames and smoke) unless of course I became aware that I was dreaming, in which case all evidence in the dream would loose power of influence on my cognition. In fact, it seems to be the case that when a person experiences extraordinary events, one of the first things that he questions is if he is dreaming. Most of the time, we humans hope that we are dreaming when extremely bad things happen, and conversely we sincerely hope that we are not dreaming when extremely good things happen. Thus, based on these examples, it is clear that evidence greatly affects the degree of certainty, but cannot remove all possibility of doubt. However, in all these cases, the dreaming person and the person in the middle of an extraordinary event, still believes that the particular thing is happening, though he may doubt it due to its extraordinary nature.

Does it follow from what has been said that certainty is sufficient for knowledge? Let us suppose that instead of a habitual liar, a person I regarded as upright and honest came into my room and told me that the building was on fire. In this case I would be fairly certain that he was telling the truth, and consequently, that the building was on fire. Now, it could still be case that the building was not on fire, for suppose that this upright and honest person, unbeknownst to me, was sleepwalking while he dreamt that the building was on fire. By the nature of the situation, I would be inclined to believe him, being fairly certain that he was telling the truth, but that certainty would not be sufficient for me to have true knowledge. There are of course many daily examples of the fact that certainty is not sufficient for knowledge, if true belief is a prerequisite for knowledge. (6)

We can see that certainty is not sufficient for knowledge, (7) but is it necessary for knowledge? There is a sense in which a person must be certain to some degree if he has knowledge. If the degree of certainty is directly proportionate to the degree of doubt, then it follows, necessarily, that one will have a degree of certainty accompanying every belief he holds. Thus, whenever a person has belief, certainty will be present, but certainty does not come before belief, they appear simultaneously. However, while it is uncommon, a person may have more doubt accompanying a particular belief than certainty, and yet he may still have knowledge. For example, I can believe that a person I know is innocent of a certain crime, but at the same time, I can have a strong feeling of doubt that he is innocent. If the majority of the evidence points to him as the perpetrator, I would doubt, to a degree, that he was innocent, but I would sill maintain enough certainty to testify to his upright character based on one sliver of evidence that would prove him innocent. At this point, we could delve into the complexities of the human mind and illustrate that, because of emotions, mental malfunctions, bad food, or whatnot, humans can sometimes doubt, for no good reason, that certain beliefs they hold as true are false. We simply do not have space here to fully expound on these issues, but let it suffice to say that there are instances in a person’s life and cognitive activity that doubt exceeds certainty relating to a particular belief which is held by that person to be true. However, this doubt does not destroy, by itself, his holding that belief to be true.

Therefore, mere certainty, as I am defining it here, is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge. Mere certainty is not necessary for knowledge in that the degree of certainty has little or no effect on weather or not the person believes the particular proposition in question to be true of false. In addition, certainty is not sufficient for knowledge because mere certainty does not validate a person’s beliefs. (8) It is important to understand these things about mere certainty in general in order to make a proper contrast with absolute certainty.

Absolute Certainty

Because so much has been said about mere certainty, far less enumeration will be needed to define absolute certainty. Thus, it will suffice to make three particular remarks about absolute certainty, then we will be ready to see whether or not it is necessary or sufficient for knowledge. First, absolute certainty, in contrast to mere certainty cannot be held in degrees but is had by a person in relation to a particular belief or it is not had at all. It makes no sense to say ‘I am fairly absolutely certain,’ rather; there is a consistent state of intensity regarding the certainty that accompanies the particular belief. Absolute certainty is not a issue of degree but of actuality.

Second, since it was established above that the degree of mere certainty a person has is related to evidence in support of the proposition, it follows that absolute certainty is not affected by evidence. Not that good evidence looses its power when a person holds a thing to be true in absolute certainty, but that there is no good evidence that works against the belief held in absolute certainty. An example of this kind of truth would be 1+1=2. It is beyond the minds comprehension to conceive of any way in which the truth of the above statement could be doubted. There are no contingent or conditional situations wherein a person could see himself coming to doubt statements like the one above. In the case of other kinds of truths, I could conceive of a conditional future situation where I would doubt the truth of a belief that I hold right now in a high degree of certainty. For example, I believe with a degree certainty that it is, let us say, noon right now; if I were to discover that my watch had stopped, then I would doubt, to a degree, that the time of day was in fact noon. However, I cannot conceive of any situation, contingent or conditional, past, present, or future, in which I could reasonably doubt that 1+1=2. Thus, there is no evidence that can affect things that are held in absolute certainty.

Thirdly, by definition, a person who has absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition will believe that it is true. This statement seems obvious and simple, but it is important to point it out to make a clear distinction between mere certainty and absolute certainty. We have already established above that certainty is not strictly related to belief, particularly, that a person could have a high level of certainty and still not hold the proposition to be true, and conversely, that a person could have a very low degree of certainty and still hold the proposition to be true. In contrast, if a person has absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition, he will necessarily hold that belief to be true. However, it is apparent that the two are not causally related. It is not that I believe a particular proposition to be true and that causes me to hold it with absolute certainty. Nor is it the case that I have absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition and that causes hold it to be true. It would take more space than we have here and more skill than I have in these matters to show exactly how belief and absolute certainty relate, but it serves our purposes here to establish that if a person has absolute certainty regarding a belief, he will hold it to be true. However, if a person holds a proposition to be true, he will not necessarily hold it in absolute certainty. It seems it depends on the nature of the proposition to determine whether or not a person will hold it in absolute certainty.

This now leads us to discus whether absolute certainty is necessary or sufficient for knowledge or not. In the same way that mere certainty was analyzed above to see if it was sufficient or necessary for knowledge, absolute certainty will be analyzed in order to determine the same. The order in which these are here addressed will be reversed from the order used above. The order above was used intentionally for the sake of the flow of the argument; here, the reversed order must be used because the discussion concerning whether absolute certainty is sufficient for knowledge will lead us directly into the next major point in the whole argument of this essay.

Therefore, the first question we will address under this head concerns whether or not absolute certainty necessary for knowledge. In much the same way that it was shown that mere certainty was not necessary for knowledge, it can be shown that absolute certainty is also not necessary for knowledge. The augmentation above showed that people can know things while having doubts accompanying their belief that the proposition they know is in fact true. Therefore, if mere certainty is not necessary for knowledge, one could hardly claim that something as strong and rare as absolute certainty was a prerequisite for any knowledge. In addition, it could also be shown that since absolute certainty and a person’s holding a proposition to be true are not causally related (as was shown above), that absolute certainty and knowledge are not causally related. It is not that a person has absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition and this leads him to hold it to be true; nor is it that a person knows particular propositions and this causes him to hold them in absolute certainty. It is my contention here that anyone who has absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition will at the same time have knowledge regarding that same proposition. This takes us to the next question.

The second question concerns whether or not absolute certainty is sufficient for knowledge. Being consistent with the argument immediately above this paragraph, my question does not concern whether or not having absolute certainty alone will being about knowledge, we have already shown that this must be false. My question here concerns the argument introduced at the end of the preceding paragraph, namely, will someone who has absolute certainty regarding a particular proposition at the same time have knowledge regarding that proposition? More specifically, the question regards the possibility impossibility of having absolute certainty without having knowledge. We have already established that a person having absolute certainty regarding a proposition will at the same time believe that proposition to be true, but it des not immediately follow from this that he has knowledge. It could be the case that someone has absolute certainty regarding a false proposition, but if this were so, how would he ever overcome such a strong, incorrect bias? According to our definition of absolute certainty, it is to hold a proposition is such a manner that it is impossible to doubt the truth of the proposition. In addition, holding theses propositions in this particular manner is not dependant on evidence but on the nature of the proposition in that once one understands or sees what the propositions is, he will not doubt the truth of it thenceforth. The example I gave of this type of proposition is 1+1=2. (9) Therefore, if I am to be correct when I hold something in absolute certainty, it depends on 1) the proposition being true, 2) the proposition being of the sort that can be ‘seen’, 3) my cognitive faculties must be functioning properly in order to ‘see’ the truth of the proposition, and 4) the proper function of my cognitive faculties is to obtain truth. (10) Here is where the problem enters; Alvin Plantinga points out this problem when he discusses proper function. The problem is this: if there is no designer of our cognitive faculties, there can be no proper function of our cognitive faculties. If our cognitive faculties have no proper function, the things we hold to be true, whether in mere or absolute certainty will not be warranted, and most likely will not be true. Thus, the answer to the question we set out to answer concerning whether absolute certainty is sufficient for knowledge or not is this: absolute certainty is evidence of true knowledge if and only if the four conditions are met concerning how the person came to be certain in this way.

There is however, one important thing I would like to point out before we move on to address the next point in the argument. Although the concepts of mere certainty and absolute certainty use the word ‘certainty’ in their names, they are not very much alike at all. According to how I have defined mere certainty, it can only be had in degrees and it is affected by evidence; absolute certainty, on the other hand, is had or it is not had, and it is not affected by evidence, it is simply obtained. Thus, absolute certainty is not the superlative degree of mere certainty, but rather it is something entirely different.

Absolute Certainty in a Naturalistic Metaphysic

I do not intend to spend much time under this head because I think that one can already see why absolute certainty will not work in a naturalistic metaphysic or worldview. I would, however, like to point out one interesting contribution from C.S. Lewis on this topic.

In an naturalistic metaphysic, there is no god and there is no spiritual realm; everything is in the ‘box’ of the universe, there is nothing outside. In a very provocative way, Lewis proves that if naturalism is true, we humans are not allowed to say that this and that is true or that idea is false; thoughts and ideas, under a naturalistic metaphysic just happen. Naturalism has the mind and all of its functions as part of the martial, cause and effect bound universe. This makes all human reason and thought no different or gander that something as simple as a rock falling. Furthermore, this makes all rational thought and argumentation vain. I will let him say it with all of his candor:

“It follows that no account of the universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real insight. A theory which explained everything else in the whole but which made it impossible to believe that our thinking was valid, would be utterly out of court. For that theory would itself have been reached by thinking, and if thinking is not valid that theory would, of course, itself be demolished. It would have destroyed its own credentials. It would be an argument which proved that no argument was sound—a proof that there are no such things a proofs—which is nonsense.” (11)

Not only does his argumentation show that naturalism does not leave room for rationality, but also that naturalism is self-refuting. Therefore, I conclude that absolute certainty, which depends on beliefs being true, is impossible under a naturalistic metaphysic because a naturalistic metaphysic cannot allow any belief to be true in an absolute sense.

Conclusion

Coming back to the very reason I took up this topic, I would like to point out the resolution of the problem. The opponents of Christianity, and theism in general, require us to 'prove' to them that Christianity is true; the problem with the request is two fold, 1) to be consistent with their own worldview they cannot believe in any sort of absolute certainty; they are contradicting themselves when they ask these questions. 2) When they ask Christians to give them proof, they are asking for evidence, but as we have seen, evidence cannot bring about absolute certainty. Evidence can assist in increasing mere certainty that a proposition is true, but it cannot bring about the rare and intriguing absolute certainty. (12)

© COPYRIGHT 2008 JOSHUA SHIREY. All Rights Reserved.

(1)J.P. Moreland; William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2003) 144-145.

(2)Hume, David, Oxford World's Classics, ed. Peter Millican, David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 18-23.

(3) www.merriam-webster.com

(4) Doug Blount, "What Has Certainty to Do With Knowledge?," 1997, unpublished paper (photocopy), Serials, W.A. Roberts Library, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, TX, Microfiche, p. 1-7, BD161.B46.1997A.

(5) Lesslie Newbigin, Proper Confidence (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 24-25.

(6) Moreland & Craig, 73

(7) Blount, 4

(8) Blount, 7

(9) The truth of this proposition is understood or seen easily. With more complex mathematical propositions (say the Pythagorean Theorem of instance), a person might have more difficulty in comprehending or seeing the proposition in its entirety, but if he could (or once he does), he will not doubt the truth of it.

(10) Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 46.

(11) C. S. Lewis, Miracles (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2000), 21-22.

(12) Author's Note: I feel that an explanation is due in order to excuse the slim number of references in the body paper. As well as I can remember, no author I have read has drawn the distinction between mere certainty and absolute certainty; therefore, there is a lack of material on this topic. I am not claiming originality, because this idea of mine has been heavily influenced be the authors of other works on epistemology. In preparation for this paper, I expected to have time to go further than I have here; I had planned to contrast the discussion on absolute certainty in a naturalistic metaphysic with a reciprocal discussion on absolute certainty in a supernatural metaphysic. I also intended to show how the Christian worldview is consistent in its truth claims and how believers can have absolute certainty in believing these truths. I simply did not have the space. I read many authors on these topics that I did not have space to talk about, but what they said influenced my view on the topics I did have space for, even though many of them were never referenced in the body of the paper. Therefore, there are not as many references as I had hoped for.

Sola Scriptura

An essay concerning the inerrancy of Scripture

Introduction

In an attempt to expound on the correlation of the Protestant Reformation proposition known as “sola Scripture” or “Scripture alone” with religious beliefs in general, it became apparent that this must be done primarily outside the context of Reformation literature and dogma. When I began to research Sola Scriptura, I found there to be a lack of documentation concerning the specific origin of this proposition and the other “Cries” or “Solas” of the Reformation. As a result of this deficiency of historical analysis, the principle of “Sola Scriptura” will be analyzed in this brief essay primarily in it essential (as opposed to historical) relation to religious beliefs.

It must be noted however, that even though one is hard pressed to find a fullness of historical data concerning the proposition of “sola Scriptura” in and of itself, it is widely accepted that this proposition was central to the Protestant Reformation. For example, R. C. Sproul, in his book Scripture Alone, states that Phillip Manlanchthon, Martin Luther’s partner in the Reformation, gave “sola Scriptura” the status of the “formal cause of the Reformation.” Although the chief theological issue of the Reformation was justification, the question of authority was at the bottom of almost every controversy raised by the Reformation.[i] In addition to understanding that “sola Scriptura” preceded the Reformation in cause, it must be noted that this principal was and is at the heart of almost every Protestant confession of faith, dating all the way back to The Theses of Berne, a Reformed confession written in 1528.[ii] Near five centuries later, the Baptist Faith and Message (2000) has contained in its first article the statement that “all Scripture is totally true and trustworthy…and (is) the supreme standard by which all human conduct, creeds, and religious opinions should be tried.” [iii]

Therefore, since the origin of this proposition of “Scripture alone” is somewhat ambiguous[iv] and it nevertheless, has deep roots in all of Protestantism, the proposition of “sola Scriptura” or “Scripture alone” will be analyzed in this essay not strictly relating to any one person, work, or creed, but as the proposition itself relates to religious epistemology in general. This task will be done under the guiding statement that pure scripture is unique in that it is the only inerrant source of information, particularly concerning divine revelation.

What I mean by ‘Pure Scripture’

Three primary issues need to be addressed to understand what I mean by saying ‘Pure Scripture’. These are 1) Canonicity, 2) Original Autographs and 3) Authorial Intent. These three issues are straightforward and I hold to them unapologetically; thus, I will not waste space with a formal defense of theses ideas but will merely explain what I mean when I say them. Concerning canonicity, I hold that pure scripture is limited to the unadulterated collection of the sixty-six books of the Old and New Testaments as listed by Athanasius in his Thirty-Ninth Festal Epistle, A.D. 367.[v] The issue of canonicity is so basic and understood in Protestantism that it is hardly ever addressed, but it is important to clearly define this term when the question is asked “What is scripture?” or even more basic “What do you accept as your sacred literature?”

Concerning the original autographs, I hold that pure scripture is determined by what was contained in the original documents that were “God Breathed” when they were written (2 Tim 3:16-17). This issue is problematic because we have none of the original autographs. The oldest manuscripts we have are only pure if they agree with the originals, but since the originals have either been lost or destroyed, there is no way to be completely certain that what we have is indeed pure. The resolution to this issue is closely related to the divine inspiration of the originals. If God did indeed inspire the scriptures, superintending their composition on both the macro and micro level, it would make sense that he would also ensure that this special revelation would be passed down faithfully.

Concerning authorial intent, I hold that pure scripture is constrained by the authorial intent of both the divine author and the human author in their writhing and superintending of the original autographs. Authorial intent is that which an author intends his audience to learn through their reading or hearing of the words he uses. Pure scripture is the message that the author(s) intended the audience to know by the reading or hearing of the written word. In the scriptures, the human authorial intent and the divine authorial intent will never be in conflict but the latter may be greater in the sense of scope than the former. Where this third issue works itself out is in the debates of hermeneutics and translation. The hermeneutic and philosophy of translation of an interpreter will directly depend on the objective the interpreter holds in these two tasks. If the objective of interpretation is to discover the message intended by the author(s), the interpretation will be more pure than if the objective is otherwise.

Again, I am not offering a defense of these three issues. If anyone wishes to analyze the scriptures form the prospective of higher criticism, there are many better sources to dive into on this issue.

The “Only Inerrant” source?

Pure scripture is the only source of information that is inerrant. The next statement, namely, “concerning divine revelation”, is extremely important in clarifying and qualifying this preceding statement. However, for this section, the issue at hand is not the extent or implication of the inerrancy of the scriptures but the exclusive nature of this category of inerrant sources of information. I hold that pure scripture is the only source of information that is inerrant. This means that other documents, creeds, narratives, philosophies, &c, where they relate to message of the scriptures may be trusted only so far as they align with that message of the scriptures.

Concerning Divine revelation

This section must be addressed now to avoid any confusion through a convolution of the issue. As I said above, this section is very important in fully understanding the meaning of the proceeding statement. After I have addressed this topic briefly I will move to address both of these topics together and show how they relate.

My thesis states, “Pure scripture is the only inerrant source of information concerning divine revelation.” The reason why the last phrase is so important is the fact that there are other souses of information which are in some sense inerrant; for example, mathematics. Nevertheless, there is no source of information other than the scriptures, about God or what he has said, that is inerrant. The purpose of the Bible is to reveal God to man; it is God’s self-disclosure of himself to humanity, particularly in the person of Jesus Christ. More simply put, the Scriptures are from God and about God; the scriptures are unique in this way, in that they are divine revelation (they have God as there source) and their purpose is to reveal God to man. Other sources of information may have one of these attributes but only scripture has both of them, at least for this age of the Church.[vi]

It may already be clear from what has been said why this idea, namely that the scriptures are the only inerrant source of information about God, was beneath almost every controversy in the Protestant Reformation and is still hotly debated today. In the tradition of the Reformers, I unapologetically hold that pure scripture is the only source which humans, and in particular, Christians, may go to gain true knowledge concerning matters of faith and practice. Information concerning these matters that does not have scripture as its source must have scripture as its validation, otherwise humanity may neither hold it to be true nor use it as a guide in conduct.

In the time of the Reformation, the authority in question was that of the pope and church councils. Luther did not say that these authorities were worthless (this was known as “solo Scriptura”) but rather that scripture was the means by which the believer must determine whether the pope or the councils were trustworthy. At the Leipzig debate in late June of 1519, Luther declared that, "a simple layman armed with the Scriptures is to be believed above a pope or a council without it.”[vii] Again, Luther’s point of contention is not that the pope or church councils should not be trusted at all, but rather that they should not be trusted as infallible or inerrant.

Today, because of the continuing effects of the enlightenment, the scientific revolution, the postmodernist movement, and many other intellectual reformations, the question of authority does not concern the papacy or a particular church council, but rather authority in itself. In the current prevailing mindset of western culture, authority has made a complete shift from divine revelation to things such as science, personal opinion, or cultural norms. Being in the wake of all these other alternatives, and in the midst of millions of people who are (possibly unknowingly) part of these schools of thought, Christians must stand firm on the foundation of pure scripture as the only trustworthy source of information concerning the things of God. Other sources of information regarding math, science, biology, physics, history, philosophy, &c may be trusted but wherever these categories cross over into the realm of faith and practice, which they inevitably will, scripture alone must be the supreme guiding principal.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my argument with an admonition. If it is true that pure scripture is unique in that it is the only inerrant source of information, particularly concerning divine revelation it would logically follow that scripture deserves our utmost diligence in the study and application thereof. Christians can believe that scripture is the infallible word of God, but if this belief does not work itself out in matters of faith and practice in their lives, then they are no better that the pagans. In addition, if the scriptures are the only infallible source of knowledge about God, then it would also logically follow that Christians should dedicate themselves to the scriptures in a manner that puts them (the scriptures) highest in the hierarchy of authority in their (the Christian’s) minds. Otherwise, Christians will use other authorities to inform their understanding of scripture instead of using scripture to inform their understanding of these other authorities. If the Bible is the infallible Word of God, all of humanity, and especially Christians, are obligated to treat it as such.

© COPYRIGHT 2008 JOSHUA SHIREY. All Rights Reserved.

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[i] R. C. Sproul: Scripture Alone p. 15

[ii] Sproul, 18

[iii] http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfm2000.asp

[iv] It is no surprise to me that the origin is ambiguous. It indeed should be if the Faithful were and had been holding to this belief regardless of what the Pope or the Reformers were saying at that particular time.

[v] http://www.bible-researcher.com/athanasius.html

[vi] This internal witness of the Holy Spirit certainly falls into this special category but the reason why it is not listed here is that the way in which Christians are to determine whether or not a certain “feeling” or “inclination” or “revelation” is indeed from God by the Spirit is by testing the content against scripture. This is why John exhorts believers to “Test the spirits” (1 John 4:1-6)

[vii] Roland Bainton: Here I Stand - A Life of Martin Luther pp. 116-117

Against the Flux Theory of Heraclitus

Background

The basic idea that I am attempting to refute in this essay is the idea that everything is in a constant state of change and is at no time static. I do not presume to know all of the intricacies of Heraclitus’ theory, but since he is the first known philosopher to systematize the idea, I will attach his name to the idea. I am not attempting to refute the idea that all things (all of reality in all dimensions and universes) are constantly changing, I am arguing that nothing, absolutely nothing, can constantly change.

Now, I realize that this is an extreme view, I also realize that there are philosophical standpoints that purport an idea of universal ‘sameness’ or ‘unity’, I am not supporting these theories. I believe that some things change; this is readily justifiable through many studies in philosophy. My contention is with the general idea of change (and movement) and how this idea is understood.

As stated above, according to the flux theory, everything is in a constant state of change. In more words, this means that nothing reaches a standstill, or a time where the thing could be said to be not changing. On the surface, this idea seems reasonable but there are many bad implications and insurmountable inconsistencies in this theory. The epistemological implications of this theory are catastrophic: if everything is always changing, then it is impossible to know anything, and even if knowledge were still possible it would be false knowledge and therefore not knowledge at all. Plato, with his introduction of forms, makes it possible to accept the flux theory and to have knowledge. Thus, the flux theory cannot apply to everything (all reality) but just to the physical world and not to the “world of the forms”. However, there are still major problems with this theory of flux being applied to the physical world.

An Important Point

First off, a point must be established, and that is that all change of the various components of the physical universe (the universe composed only of atoms) is nothing more or less than a change in location. All heat change is a change in the speed of the vibration of the molecules. All ageing is a disorientation of the original order of the thing that is ageing. All chemical reactions are a moving of the electrons, neutrons, and protons in various different orientations. I could go on and on but I hope that you already get the idea.

Now, as far as I know, motion can only explain the changes that happen to the physical universe. There are other types of changes (i.e. spiritual) but if these changes affect the physical universe, and I believe there are millions of cases of this happening, then the corresponding change or ‘affect’ in the physical universe can be nothing more or less that a change in location of the things affected. Thus, integrating this idea into the flux theory, we now have ‘everything is in a state of constant motion.’

Of course, it is the case that God could end the existence of certain atoms or objects in the physical universe or he could create and introduce wholly new things into the physical universe. However, these actions could not be said to be changes in or of the physical universe since it is a introduction of new material and not a changing or ‘alteration’ of what is already there.

The Problem

Some of you may have already figured out where I am going. If you paid close attention in the last three paragraphs you might have already pieced together what the problem is. The problem I have found with the flux theory is simple on paper but hard to grasp, yet once it is grasped it is very easy to remember, articulate, and argue against, so I ask you to be patient. The essence of the problem is founded in an apparent paradox: there seems to be only two explanations of how change takes place and both of them are inadequate or even obviously false. If something is always changing and is never static or at a standstill, then the two options are 1) varying segments of time are in reality all infinite in duration or 2) the distance that the parts of the changing objects are traversing is in reality equal to zero.

How did I come to this paradox? The discovery of this paradox came to me several years ago when I was contemplating movement in itself. How and why I was contemplating motion in itself is inconsequential, but it is important to know that the paradox first came in relation to motion alone and not to physical change in general. Motion, according to the simplest definition I could come up with, was ‘an objects change in location’. This definition seemed to be sufficient until I actually tried to put it to work.

I will now try to explain how this mental experiment I conducted. To make the discussion more simple, let the object that we use in this example be and electron, since it is, as far as we know, an indivisible object. It would cause confusion and loss of focus to use a divisible object such as a ball, but you can think of a ball in this example if you want. Let us say that an electron is moving from point A to point B. The first question I asked was “how many places will the electron exist in during its traverse of the distance between the two points?” Now, mathematics, physics, and science tells us that there are an infinite number of locations in between any two point in space. In some respect they are right, for, any distance can always be divided by two (or any other number greater than one) and zero distance will never be reached. There are, perhaps, an infinite number of theoretical measurements in between point A and point B but that dose not necessarily mean (and I will argue cannot mean) that there are an infinite number of places for the electron to exist in as it moves.

Back to the example, if there were an infinite number of places for the electron to exist in and it does exist in each of them for any amount of time as it travels, then the electron would never reach point B. Any number (other than zero) multiplied by infinity equals infinity. However, if the electron spent no time at each of these places, then the electron could not exist at all, because it would not be anywhere at any time. Any number (including infinity) multiplied by zero is zero. Thus, we come to the apparent paradox: either 1) varying segments of time are in reality all infinite in duration or 2) the distance that electron travels is in reality equal to zero. Either every movement of anything from any point A and B happens after an infinite amount of time has elapsed, or all measurements between any point A and B are all illusions and are actually zero.

The Answer

Some may argue that this is where we must stop, that when a paradox is reached we must accept that we will never know the answer, or that we must wait until new discoveries are made. I think that answers can be found, if we are willing to believe some very interesting things. My solution to this paradox is very radical and will seem strange at first, but I believe that it is the only way to explain what is happening when a thing moves.

There are, according to my theory, a limited number of places a thing can be. As a thing ‘moves’ from pint A to point B it only exists in a limited number of places (probably an enormous number, but less than infinity). But here is where it gets weird: there can be no time between when the thing ‘moves’ from one of the limited number of places it can exist (I will call these places ‘cells’) to the next. If there is a time when the thing is ‘in between’ the cells, we are brought back to the essence of the problem to which this theory was formed to remedy. What I am arguing for is an instantaneous change of location from cell 1, to cell 2, to cell 3, etc. In addition, the time it takes for the electron to get from point A to B is spent remaining at rest (existing) for a limited time (probably very short, but longer that zero) in the limited number cells. Any limited number multiplied by a limited number equals a limited number. These cells would be the only absolute locations where any indivisible thing could reside, which means that the indivisible parts of divisible things would reside in different cells at different times while still holding together through molecular attraction or covalent bonds. I can see no other way of explaining motion. I warned you that it would be weird.

Now, of course, I have no idea what these cells look like, how small they are, if they overlap each other, what exactly determines how long things stay in these cells, or if they have independent existence outside the presence of matter. It would take much scientific research to discover the answers to these questions. However, this theory of absolute location (as I have coined it) is the only answer that allows for change of location, for distance to be real, and for our measurement of time to be real. All others lead to absurdities that include infinite restrictions or extensions of space and time respectively.

Conclusion

If the theory of absolute location is the only way to explain motion in the physical universe then it is part of describing any change in the physical universe. This means that everything, although it may be ‘moving’ is in reality always at a state of rest. Things ‘change’ in that they instantaneously change location from cell to cell, but this change cannot be “constant” as Heraclitus purposed. All things must stay static for some amount of time, or else they cannot exist.

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